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Chaotic Encryption for 10-Gb
Ethernet Optical Links
Adrián Pérez-Resa , Miguel Garcia-Bosque , Carlos Sánchez-Azqueta , and Santiago Celma
Abstract— In this paper, a new physical layer encryption
method for optical 10-Gb Ethernet links is proposed. Necessary
modifications to introduce encryption in Ethernet 10GBase-R
standard have been considered. This security enhancement has
consisted of a symmetric streaming encryption of the 64b/66b
data flow at physical coding sublayer level thanks to two
keystream generators based on a chaotic algorithm. The overall
system has been implemented and tested in a field programmable
gate array. Ethernet traffic has been encrypted, transmitted, and
decrypted over a multimode optical link. Experimental results
are analyzed concluding that it is possible to cipher traffic at
this level and hide the complete Ethernet traffic pattern from
any passive eavesdropper. In addition, no overhead is introduced
during encryption, getting no losses in the total throughput.
Index Terms— Ethernet, 10GBASE-R, cryptography, stream
cipher, skew tent map.
I. INTRODUCTION
NOWADAYS, thanks to advances in optical com-munication technologies it is possible to meet the
ever-increasing data traffic demand of modern networks.
It is estimated that IP traffic in data centers will reach
15.3 Zettabytes per year by 2020 [1].
On the other hand, security and confidentiality in communi-
cations networks are important fields of study. In the specific
case of optical networks, some studies were carried out in the
past to discern whether the degradation of a link or failure
of a service is due to a natural network defect or an external
attack [2], [3]. In fact, threat analysis in the physical layer
is considered crucial for secure communications [4], [5].
However, nowadays there are simple methods for intercepting
the signal without appreciably interfering in optical communi-
cation [6]. Such methods use simple fiber coupling devices and
electro-optical converters and numerous examples are easily
available for the public on the Internet.
In a layered communication model, such as OSI (Open
System Interconnection) or TCP/IP (Transmission Control
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Fig. 1. Simple example of different access technologies for a CEN (Carrier
Ethernet Network).
Protocol/Internet Protocol), ‘in-flight’ encryption can be car-
ried out at different communication layers. For example, well
known encryption methods for layer 2 and layer 3 are the
protocols MACsec [7] and IPsec [8] respectively.
At physical layer, there are security solutions directly
related to the optical technology such as QKD (Quantum
Key Distribution) [9] or OCDM (Optical Code-Division
Multiplexing) [10], or related to payload encryption in some
optical protocols as OTN (Optical Transport Network) stan-
dard [11]. Encryption at physical layer brings some bene-
fits such as minimum latency and zero overhead, achieving
maximum link efficiency. In fact, commercial OTN equipment
performing encryption at line rate is able to achieve a 100%
throughput in contrast with encryption at other communication
layers [12]. As an example, in IPsec the inherent overhead
introduced during encryption reduces the overall throughput
between 20% and 90% of the maximum achievable [13].
Today one of the most used technologies for the
access to optical transport networks is Ethernet. As shown
in Fig. 1, some access technologies in CENs (Carrier
Ethernet Networks) ‘last mile’ are Ethernet over Fiber (Direct
Fiber, SONET/SDH, PON), Ethernet over PDH, Wireless
Ethernet, etc. [14].
10GBase-R is one of the most widely used physical layer
standards for Ethernet at 10 Gbps in optical links, but nowa-
days there is no mechanism or standard providing physical
layer security on it. For this reason, the main motivation of this
work is to propose and implement the necessary modifications
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Fig. 2. PCS structure and the proposed encryption function 10G-PHYsec.
to introduce encryption in its PCS (Physical Coding Sublayer)
level. We have called this method 10G-PHYsec.
An encryption system at physical layer of Ethernet provides
the mentioned advantages such as no overhead, low latency
and also obfuscation of customer data traffic patterns, which
results in an overall improvement of security. An example of
the same property is proved at a lower transmission speed in
an Ethernet interface using 1000Base-X physical layer [15].
In this case the encryption mechanism is completely different,
as 8b/10b encoding is used, consisting of an additive stream
cipher where modulo-267 addition is performed between the
keystream and plaintext.
The article is organized as follows: Section II explains the
general structure of the encryption system in the Ethernet
physical layer 10GBase-R, Section III explains the encryption
infrastructure composed by the stream cipher operation and
the synchronization mechanism between TX (transmitter) and
RX (receiver), Section IV deals with keystream generation
of the proposed stream cipher; Section V details the system
implementation and test results and finally in Section VI
conclusions obtained in this work are given.
II. PCS LAYER ENCRYPTION
In Ethernet standards, the physical layer is usually divided
into three sublayers with different functionalities: PCS (Phys-
ical Coding Sublayer), PMD (Physical Medium Dependent)
and PMA (Physical Medium Attachment). PCS sublayer per-
forms functions such as link establishment, data encoding,
scrambling, synchronization, clock rate adaptation, etc.
As many high speed standards in optical Ethernet, a base-
band serial data transmission is carried out while clock fre-
quency information is embedded in the serial bitstream itself.
At PMA sublayer a CDR (Clock and Data Recovery) circuit
is responsible for extracting timing information from the data
stream. As a critical part of a typical transceiver for high
speed communications many researches have been carried out
about this kind of circuits [16], [17]. In order to facilitate the
work of the CDR circuit, information is usually encoded in
such a way that a good transition density and short run length
are achieved. Also a DC-balanced serial data stream must be
guaranteed by getting a good disparity, which is important for
some transmission media, as optical links.
In the case of 10GBase-R standard, 64b/66b encoding
is used at PCS sublayer. This type of block-line encoding
achieves the properties set out before in a statistical way thanks
to the scrambling of the bitstream. The basic structure of the
PCS sublayer in 10GBase-R standard is shown in Fig. 2, where
its main function blocks such as 64b/66b encoder/decoder and
scrambler/descrambler are shown.
In order to encrypt physical layer when block-line encoding
is used, it is necessary to preserve the mentioned encoder
properties, therefore the location of the cipher in the datapath
must be taken into account. In this work we propose to carry
out encryption at the input of the scrambler and decryption at
the output of the descrambler as shown in Fig. 2
Unlike other encryption mechanisms such as the MACsec,
where the encrypted data are directly the Ethernet packets,
in this work, the 64b/66b data flow is directly encrypted thanks
to a stream cipher based on a chaotic algorithm. The main
advantages of this method is that there is no throughput loss
and that not only data packet content is encrypted but also the
link activity or Ethernet data traffic pattern. By encrypting
at 64b/66b block level, both data and control blocks are
obfuscated, such as start and end frame blocks or control
blocks with IDLE control characters inside, making frame
pattern indecipherable.
III. ENCRYPTION INFRASTRUCTURE
The encryption infrastructure is shown in Fig. 3. This
structure is composed of three blocks, the TX_ENCRYPT,
RX_DECRYPT and the MANAGEMENT module.
A. Encryption Function
The stream cipher operation is performed by the
CIPHER_OP_TX and CIPHER_OP_RX modules in Fig. 3.
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Fig. 3. Encryption infrastructure for 10G-PHYsec function.
The encoded blocks after the 64b/66b encoder are composed
of a two-bit synchronization header plus a 64-bit payload,
forming a 66-bit block. On the one hand, the 66-bit block
type depends on the type field inside the block payload and
the value of the 2-bit block synchronization header, then both,
block payload and synchronization header are necessary to be
encrypted to mask the block type. On the other hand, the main
purpose of the synchronization header is to guarantee 66-bit
block alignment while limiting the run length to 66 bits. This
header only has two possible values (‘01’ or ‘10’), which
produces a transition between 0 and 1 every 66 bits. Thus,
after encryption, it is necessary to preserve this bit transition.
The stream cipher operation is shown in Fig. 4. Both
modules CIPHER_OP_TX and CIPHER_OP_RX perform the
same operation. Firstly, the 66-bit block, D_IN, is split in two
parts, the synchronization header and the block payload. The
block payload is directly encrypted by performing an XOR
operation between its 64 bits and a 64-bit keystream data
sequence, called ‘keystream data’ in Fig. 4. The 2-bit syn-
chronization header is mapped to values ‘0’ or ‘1’ depending,
respectively, on whether it is equal to ‘01’ or ‘10’. Then,
the mapped value is encrypted performing an XOR operation
with a 1-bit keystream sequence called ‘keystream sync’. After
encryption, this new value is reverse mapped resulting in a new
header ‘01’ or ‘10’ depending on whether it is ‘0’ or ‘1’. In this
way, the transition between 0 and 1 every 66 bits is guaranteed.
Finally, the new synchronization header is concatenated with
the encrypted block payload resulting in the output D_OUT,
which is sent to the scrambler when encrypting or to the
64b/66b decoder when decrypting.
B. Encryption Synchronization
It is necessary to activate and deactivate the keystream
generators and the encryption operation synchronously
between transmitter and receiver. For that purpose, the
MANAGEMENT module in Fig. 3 performs the insertion and
extraction of two management sequences into the 64b/66b
block stream. One of these sequences is used for the encryp-
tion activation and the other one for deactivation.
TABLE I
64B/66B BLOCK FORMATS IN 10GBASE-R STANDARD
TABLE II
LINK FAULT SIGNALING ORDERED SETS AND
NEW PROPOSED ORDERED SETS
In order to maintain the concordance with the standard,
the format of the implemented control sequence is equivalent
to that of an ordered set. Among available 64b/66b block types,
the one selected for this work is 0x55. As shown in Table I,
inside this block type two consecutive ordered sets can be
transmitted.
On the other hand, the possible ordered sets established in
the standard are between values 0x00 and 0x03 and they are
used for link fault signaling. Since values above 0x03 are out
of use and are reserved for future standardization, in this work
the new ordered sets for encryption control signaling have been
defined as shown in Table II. They have been called ‘Cipher
ON’ and ‘Cipher OFF’, and their values are 0x04 and 0x05,
respectively.
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Fig. 4. Stream cipher operation.
The final encryption sequence for enabling the encryption
consists of the 0x55 block type filled with two consecutive
‘Cipher ON’ ordered sets. In this work this block is called
‘Cipher_ON block’. For disabling encryption the sequence is
the same but using two ‘Cipher OFF’ ordered sets and the
resulting block is called ‘Cipher_OFF block’.
For carrying out the insertion of these new control sequences
the structure shown in Fig. 3 has been used. This infrastructure
allows carrying out the generation, insertion and capture of
a future set of messages that extends the encryption man-
agement functionality, such as key refresh or other options
between transmitter and receiver. The basic operation of this
infrastructure is described below.
The CIPHER_OP_TX module is responsible for implement-
ing the encryption operation. Initially, it is disabled, allowing
the 64b/66b blocks to be transparently passed from the encoder
to the scrambler. To start the encryption of the 64b/66b block
stream, the MANAGEMENT module acts on the INSERT
module to send the encryption start message. This message
is inserted in 64b/66b block stream by replacing one 0x1E
type block filled with IDLE control characters /I/ with the new
Cipher_ON block. When CAPTURE module detects the pres-
ence of a Cipher_ON block it enables the CIPHER_OP_TX
module and TX keystream generators (KEYSTREAM TX
SYNC and KEYSTREAM TX DATA in Fig. 3), which
starts the encryption process after Cipher_ON block has been
transmitted.
In the receiver, the module CIPHER_OP_RX is in charge
of performing the decryption operation. Like the transmit-
ter, it is initially inactive, enabling 64b/66b blocks to be
transparently passed from the descrambler to the decoder.
When the CAPTURE module receives the Cipher_ON block,
CIPHER_OP_RX module and RX keystream generator mod-
ules (KEYSTREAM RX SYNC and KEYSTREAM RX DATA
in Fig. 3) are enabled, starting to decrypt the 64b/66b data flow
after Cipher_ON block. Subsequently, the control sequence
Cipher_ON is extracted from the data stream in the EXTRACT
module, which replaces it with a 0x1e type block filled with /I/
control characters (reverse operation of the INSERT module).
Thanks to this procedure, the keystream generators in TX and
RX are synchronized and data can be deciphered correctly.
In order to disable the encryption, the same process is used,
but sending Cipher_OFF blocks instead of Cipher_ON.
IV. ENCRYPTION KEYSTREAM
The keystream generator is responsible for generating a
pseudorandom sequence to carry out the encryption of the
signal. In this work the generation of this pseudorandom
sequence is based on a chaotic algorithm.
As the encryption operation consists of two XOR opera-
tions, one for block payload and another one for the syn-
chronization header, two keystream generators are necessary.
Both generators have different output widths, the generator for
block payload encryption produces a 64-bit sequence, while
the keystream generator for synchronization header is only
1-bit wide, as shown in Fig. 4.
Next, a description of the keystream generator is given, and
also some security considerations are discussed, such as the
achieved keystream randomness or the key space used.
A. Chaotic Pseudorandom Bitstream Generator
In the last decades chaotic systems have been taken into
account for the design of new cryptographic systems. Their
high sensitivity to the initial conditions or control parame-
ters (also called ’butterfly effect’) and their unpredictable
pseudo-random orbits are the most well-known characteristics
of chaotic systems. These characteristics are very similar to
those that a good cryptographic algorithm should have [18].
All these considerations have given rise to new private and
public encryption proposals [19], [20].
A variant of the chaotic map called STM (Skew-Tent-Map)
has been used in this work to generate the pseudorandom
bitstream, used as keystream of the proposed cryptographic
system. Based on previous work by our group, this chaotic
map has already been theoretically studied in [21] and [22].
The hardware block diagram of the basic STM algorithm is
shown in Fig. 5 and its equations are shown below:






(1 − xi ) / (1 − γ ) , xi ∈ (γ, 1] (1)
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Fig. 5. Skew Tent Map block diagram.
Fig. 6. Basic keystream generator. The 189-bit key is the concatenation of
the three parameters (y0, x0, γ ).
where its control parameter γ and initial state x0 are real
numbers whose values are included in the interval (0, 1).
One of the main advantages of this chaotic map is that
it maintains its chaoticity for all values of γ and x0,
which makes it more adequate for cryptographic applications
than other maps whose parameter space contains periodic
windows [18].
One important problem of digital implementations of
chaotic maps under finite-precision and fixed-point arithmetic
is that their dynamical properties are degraded with respect
to their original continuous versions [23]. As studied in [21]
and [22] an LFSR (Linear Feedback Shift Register) can be
used to improve the digital implementation of the chaotic map
shown in (1), reducing the mentioned dynamical degradation.
Thanks to this modification it is possible to obtain an important
increase in the keystream period and therefore achieve better
randomness [24].
The basic keystream generator used in this work is shown
in Fig. 6. A 61-step LFSR has been added to the Skew
Tent Map module. The key for this basic keystream generator
consists of the initial state and control parameter (γ, x0), of the
STM cell and the initial state of the LFSR (y0).
The STM cell has been implemented with an internal 64-bit
state whose output is the vector xi [63 : 0]. The improvement
related to the LFSR is to perform the XOR operation between
the least significant 8 bits of LFSR and the STM cell outputs.
The state returned to the STM cell will no longer be the
previous state calculated by it, but a new state, x˜i to which a
small noise generated by the LFSR has been added thanks to
the XOR operation. The generator output function consists of
taking the 16 least significant bits of xi and discarding the rest.
For the payload block encryption, a 64-bit keystream
sequence is necessary, thus a bank of basic keystream genera-
tors has been built. The bank consists of four 16-bit generators
Fig. 7. 64-Bit Keystream Generator for 64b/66b block payload.
Fig. 8. NIST test results for a bitstream generated using STM-LFSR
algorithm.
whose outputs are concatenated to give a 64-bit output. This
structure is shown in Fig. 7.
For the synchronization header encryption, as only a 1-bit
keystream sequence is needed the basic STM cell in Fig. 6 has
been used, but in this case only the least significant bit of xi
is taken as output.
B. Keystream Output Analysis
The keystream obtained at the output of both generators
must be analyzed in order to test their randomness, as one
important requirement for a secure stream cipher is that their
keystream must be undistinguishable from a truly random
sequence. In order to check this property, sequences gener-
ated by the basic generator in Fig. 6 were subjected to the
NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology) SP
800-22 battery of test [25]. Both generators passed these tests.
An example is shown in Fig. 8, where a particular sequence
is tested.
C. Security Considerations: Key Space
One of the security considerations that has to be taken
into account is the key space size [18]. Some recommen-
dations establish 112 bits as minimum key size, as NIST
This article has been accepted for inclusion in a future issue of this journal. Content is final as presented, with the exception of pagination.
6 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON CIRCUITS AND SYSTEMS–I: REGULAR PAPERS
Fig. 9. Scheme of FPGA implementation for 10G Ethernet interface with encryption function.
recommendation [26], others as ENISA (European Union
Agency for Network and Information Security) report [27]
recommends 128 or 256 bits for mid-term and long-term
security respectively.
For the basic keystream generator in Fig. 6, the complete
key is composed by two 64-bit parameters (γ, x0) and one
61-bit parameter y0. The resulting key is 189-bit length, which
can be considered good enough to guarantee security against
brute-force attacks.
D. Security Considerations: Sensitivity
Sensitivity to the initial conditions and control parameters
is a well-known characteristic of chaotic maps. It leads to
the desired diffusion property that any cryptosystem must
have under small changes in the secret key. While in the
proposed cryptosystem, the STM cell meets this property,
sensitivity to plaintext and ciphertext changes is not achieved.
It means that as other stream ciphers, a single bit change on
the plaintext only changes one bit on the ciphertext and vice
versa. Therefore if the keystream generator was restarted with
the same key a successful differential known-plaintext attack
could be applied. This fact must be taken into account, above
all when continuous IDLE sets are being transmitted over the
link.
E. Security Considerations: Map Reconstruction Attack
One important security problem related with chaotic sys-
tems is the possibility of reconstructing the map and inferring
the control parameters. This type of attack can be performed
by analyzing the output sequence and plotting xi+1 versus xi .
As an example, if the attacker knows the value of xi and
xi+1 , he could use (1) for f (xi−1) and f (xi ) to calculate
the values of γ and xi−1. Solutions for this kind of attacks
are to shuffle/truncate the chaotic orbit before using it for
encryption [28].
The fact that we are using only the least 16 significant bits
from each xi for the encryption, limits the information revealed
to an attacker. If an attacker could know the least significant
16 bits of xi and xi+1, there would still be 248 possible values
for each xi or xi+1, then 296 for the combination of both.
In addition, the eight least significant bits of each xi
are XORed with the LFSR output which makes the map
reconstruction more difficult.
Fig. 10. Test setup scheme.
F. Security Considerations: Other Considerations
Initial key configuration and key refreshing are important
mechanisms in any cryptographic system. In this work, keys
have been preconfigured in transmitter and receiver thanks
to the FPGA debug system. The implementation of the key
management procedure based on 64b/66b control blocks has
been let as future work.
As mentioned in Section III, a future set of control messages
could be expanded thanks to encryption infrastructure shown
in Fig. 3. In order to avoid malicious manipulation or gener-
ation of these kinds of messages, a MAC (Message Authenti-




The overall system has been implemented in a Xilinx
Virtex 7 FPGA. In the setup for test, the FPGA has been con-
nected to two SFP+ (Small Form-Factor Pluggable) modules
capable of transmitting at a rate of 10.3125 Gbps at 850 nm
over multimode fiber. The FPGA design consists of two 10G
Ethernet interfaces including the 10G-PHYsec function and
two Ethernet Frame Generator modules connected to them.
The structure of the 10G Ethernet Interfaces is shown in Fig 9.
It includes the MAC module and the PHY (PCS and PMA
blocks). The PHY is connected directly to the SFP+ modules
thanks to the FPGA SERDES (Serializer-Deserializer) circuit.
In the MAC side, Ethernet Interface is connected to the
Ethernet Frame Generator to test the encrypted link with real
traffic. It allows to verify that no frames are lost and no
CRC (Cyclic Redundancy Check) errors are produced during
encryption.
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Fig. 11. Test setup photo with SFP+ modules working at 10 Gbps rate.
In Fig. 10 and Fig. 11 the diagram and a photo of the
hardware test setup are shown, respectively. Since the key can
be configured separately for TX and RX encryption modules
in each interface, it is possible to test the bidirectional link
with different keys in each direction.
B. Encryption Results
The conclusions drawn from simulation and hardware
debugging can be summarized in the following points:
1) Encryption/Decryption works correctly and synchro-
nously without harming data traffic or link establishment
between 10G Ethernet interfaces. Thanks to the frame
and CRC counters inside Ethernet Frame Generators it
has been possible to check that neither frame losses
nor CRC errors are produced. Particularly, bursts of
1024-byte length frames were tested with a duration up
to 106 frames and a throughput between 10% and 98%
of the maximum line rate.
2) Transmitted frames are indecipherable thanks to encryp-
tion. When encryption keys are different between trans-
mitter and receiver, no valid frames are received in
the receiver because it is impossible to recover the
right 64b/66b block flow.
3) When encrypting, data traffic pattern is indistinguishable
from a continuous IDLE pattern, then it is able to
hide the pattern of Ethernet traffic from any malicious
observer.
For this last capability it is interesting to know the signal
behavior at the input of the scrambler and output of the
descrambler. Particularly, the block synchronization header can
give information about the transmission state.
If the encryption is not enabled, the synchronization header
takes the value “10” when transmitting Ethernet frames and
“01” during the IFG (Inter Frame Gap) periods and frame
boundaries. If no frame is transmitted, the synchronization
header is a continuous value “01”, as IDLE control characters
are being continuously transmitted.
When encryption is enabled, the synchronization header
switches randomly between “01” and “10” and the same
TABLE III
FPGA RESOURCES USED BY PCS MODULE
TABLE IV
FPGA RESOURCES USED BY ENCRYPTION INFRASTRUCTURE
AND KEYSTREAM GENERATORS IN RX AND TX
TABLE V
FPGA RESOURCES USED IN KEYSTREAM GENERATOR SUBMODULES
happens with the 64b/66b block payload that is randomized
thanks to the keystream. This happens in both situations,
with or without Ethernet traffic being transmitted over the link.
This effect makes the data traffic pattern indistinguishable.
C. Implementation Results
Regarding the resources used by the PCS layer, it is
interesting to study the increase in resources needed to imple-
ment the encryption features. In Table III, post-synthesis
resource estimation is shown. When encryption is included it
is possible to see a large increase in LUTs (Look-Up Table),
registers and DSP (Digital Signal Processing) cells. Approx-
imately this increment consists of 10100 LUTs, 4915 reg-
isters and 160 DSP cells and is distributed among the
RX/TX keystream generators and the encryption infrastruc-
ture, as shown in Table IV. In Table V, resources for
keystream generator (KEYSTREAM GEN) are decomposed
into the 64- bit keystream generator (STM BANK) plus
LFSR module used in block payload encryption and the 1-bit
keystream generator (STM_1BIT) for block synchronization
header encryption.
In the case of DSP cells, 16 of them are necessary to
implement the multiplications inside each STM_CELL, as the
chaotic map implementation requires it. A total of 80 DSP
cells are necessary for the complete keystream generator.
D. Comparison With Other Solutions
In Table VI a resource and throughput comparison with
other chaotic encryption solutions is shown. This comparison
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TABLE VI
CHAOTIC CELL COMPARISON WITH OTHER SOLUTIONS
is only illustrative as the FPGA device used in each implemen-
tation is different. In this work Virtex-7 is used, however in
the other solutions different devices are used, such as Artix-7,
Virtex-6, Virtex-5 and Spartan-3E. While CLB structure in
Artix-7, Virtex-6 and Virtex-7 is similar in terms of LUTs
and registers, with four 6-input LUTs and 8 registers per
slice, in Virtex-5 each slice contains four 6-input LUTs
and 4 registers. The difference is higher with Spartan-3E,
a much older device with only 2 LUTs and 2 register per
slice. For this reason the comparison is made in terms of
Encryption_rate/register and Encryption_rate/LUT.
As a comparison among different chaotic cells is a difficult
task, we have included in Table VI not only their hardware
resources and encryption throughput but also some parameters
relative to their structure, such as the internal state and output
bit width, and the total key/parameters length. Assuming that
every chaotic cell passes the randomness tests, authors con-
sider that the mentioned parameters are important as a measure
of the overall security provided by them. Indeed, some of
the solutions shown in Table VI are proposed as encryption
algorithms while others are used only as PRNGs (Pseudo
Random Number Generator) for cryptographic applications,
such as key generation.
On the one hand, key size shows how secure can be a
cell against brute-force attacks, while the bit width difference
between the internal state and output shows how secure can be
against a map reconstruction attack. Both parameters affect the
results in the hardware resources and encryption rate shown
in Table VI. In particular, a longer key and internal state mean
that the overall hardware resources are increased, since the
width of arithmetic operands inside the cell also increases.
In the same way the maximum operation frequency achieved
by the cell is decreased, which reduces the final throughput.
On the other hand, the opposite effect happens with the output
width, a longer output means higher throughput, as more
bits per cycle are available for being used in the encryption
process.
For example, in [29] the resulting chaotic cell with a 192-bit
key obtains its output from the 16 least significant bits of its
64-bit internal state, while in [30], the chaotic cell, also with
a 64-bit state, uses only as output one of its bits, however
it has a key of only 64 bits. In [31], among the several
maps that are implemented, we have selected Bernoulli for
the comparsion, it has a 52-bit state and only outputs one bit
every 5 clock cycles. Other implementations, as [32], and [33]
use their complete state as output, with 96 and 20 bits, respec-
tively. Regarding [34] and [35], they use a chaotic iteration
post-processing technique to improve the randomness of linear
PRNGs. These do not need DSP cells, however the complete
output of the chaotic post-processing is used as output.
According to these parameters, key size, internal state and
output bits, the proposed work, together with [29] and [31],
presents the best security, with a key of more than 128 bits
and less than the 25% of its internal state bits revealed.
In terms of Encryption_rate and Encryption_rate/resource
the implementation in this work clearly achieves a good result.
Although [32], [34] and [35] present better Encryption_rate,
it is at expense of using their complete state as output, which
reduces the security. Indeed they are mainly proposed as
PRNGs.
Regarding to the DSP cells used, the proposed solution
needs a higher quantity than others, as in [31] and [33].
However, it is also at the expense of reducing other parameters.
For example in both solutions Encryption_rate is lower than
this work. Moreover, in [33] the complete state is taken as
output and the key size is only 60 bits, which disminishes the
security achieved by this solution.
Finally, if we compare this work with [29], the most similar
in terms of security, this work achieves better Encryption_rate
figures. However, it is important to remark that the FPGA used
in [29] is a Virtex-6, a 40 nm device, while Virtex-7 used in
this work is a 28 nm device. Because of that, the proposed
STM cell has been also implemented configuring the target
device as the same in [29]. In this case the obtained hardware
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resources are similar to those used in Virtex-7 but resulting
in a lower maximum operation frequency of 154.2 MHz. This
fact reduces the Encryption_rate but anyway it is still higher
that in [29].
VI. CONCLUSION
As far as the authors are aware, this is the first time that
a 10GBase-R Ethernet physical layer encryption method has
been proposed and developed. The proposed new encryption
function 10G-PHYsec consists of symmetric ciphering at PCS
sublayer of the 64b/66b block stream transmitted over an
optical link. Encryption based on an original chaotic cipher
has been tested with real Ethernet traffic and it has been
concluded that the proposed system works correctly without
harming data traffic or link establishment, making Ethernet
frames indecipherable and obfuscating completely the data
traffic patterns. These features improve the security at physical
level with no throughput losses, null overhead and low latency,
and it is compatible with other solutions at other layers where
data packets must be modified by adding extra overhead and
delay during their transmission.
Another advantage of the proposed method is that by
preserving 64b/66b coding properties as DC-balance, short
run length, and transmission density, physical layer encryption
is achieved without the necessity of change any of subse-
quent hardware elements in the TX/RX chain, as SERDES
(Serializer/Deserializer), CDR and driver circuits or optical
components as commercial SFP modules. In addition, as this
method is based in the 64b/66b encoding, it could be scaled
to other standards with higher transmission rates based also in
this encoding method, such as in 40 or 100 Gigabit Ethernet.
Although it is necessary an increment of FPGA resources
for the proposed physical layer modifications, it mainly lies
with the keystream generator module and entails an encryption
throughput better than other solutions based on chaotic maps.
Finally, we are working on improving the encryption pro-
tocol to add functionalities such as new control messages
for temporary key refresh and some mechanism for message
authentication control.
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